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The Feeling of Personal Ownership of One’s Mental States:
A Conceptual Argument and Empirical Evidence for an Essential,
but Underappreciated, Mechanism of Mind
Stan B. Klein
University of California, Santa Barbara
I argue that the feeling that one is the owner of his or her mental states is not an intrinsic
property of those states. Rather, it consists in a contingent relation between consciousness
and its intentional objects. As such, there are (a variety of) circumstances, varying in their
interpretive clarity, in which this relation can come undone. When this happens, the content
of consciousness still is apprehended, but the feeling that the content “belongs to me” no
longer is secured. I discuss the implications of a mechanism enabling personal ownership
for understanding a variety of clinical syndromes as well normal mental function.
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“If you want to know what something might be good
for, examine the situation where it is no longer present”
(Weiskrantz, 1997, p. 6)
The ability to read the above quote, though
deceptively simple in practice, is a quite re-
markable achievement. A cascade of subexpe-
riential processes must, on serious reflection,
come into play—including, but not limited to,
attention to the printed symbols, mechanisms
that convert the attended objects to meaningful
content, fitting this content to the context in
which it is encountered, and so forth.
After extensive processing, the content of this
subexperiential analysis will (under normal cir-
cumstances) be delivered to consciousness as its
intentional object, resulting in the mental state
we call reading (intentionality, in the present
context, refers to the proposition that all con-
scious states have content—that is, they are
about something; e.g., Anscombe, 1965; Bren-
tano, 1995; Textor, 2013). But (and this is a
core contention of this article), the automatic
and flawless manner in which consciousness
takes possession of its intentional objects masks
a fundamental relation—specifically, the rela-
tion that enables a person to prereflectively ex-
perience his or her mental states as personally
owned.
In this article my interest is with the experi-
ential aspects of mind (e.g., Klein, 2015a). In
particular, I present empirical evidence and con-
ceptual argument for a mechanism (or mecha-
nisms) that enables consciousness to take own-
ership of its intentional objects (where
ownership entails a sense of personal possession
that, at least under normal circumstances, is
prereflective—see “Personal and Perspectival
Ownership” below). Such a mechanism has not,
in my opinion, received sustained analysis in
psychological treatments of the mind—though
it has been accorded an increasingly prominent
role in the interpretation of certain psychopa-
thologies (e.g., Bortolotti & Broome, 2009) as
well as the philosophy of mind (e.g., Lane,
2012). The goal of this article is to make the
case for a need to devote greater attention to an
aspect of experiential reality that has significant
implications for normal, as well as the dysfunc-
tional, workings of the mind.
But, do we really need to add another pro-
cess to the arsenal of hypothetical entities
with which psychologists populate the mind?
Especially one whose superfluity seems so
evident? After all, isn’t it little more than “a
penetrating glimpse into the obvious” to ar-
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gue that my feeling of ownership consists in
the fact that my mental states take place in me
(i.e., in my head)? Isn’t one’s personal own-
ership guaranteed by one’s personal perspec-
tive? Is there a pressing need to add to the
mental clutter by postulating what seems a
mechanism based on a tautology?
To put things bluntly—Yes! As I hope to
show, perspective-based inference is found se-
riously wanting when the ownership relation
fails—that is, in cases of psycho- and neuro-
pathology (see “Functional Independence of
Content and Ownership: The Experienced Loss
of Personal Ownership in Cases of Clinical Pa-
thology” and “Functional Independence of Con-
tent and Ownership: The Experienced Loss of
Personal Ownership in Cases of Nonclinical
Pathology” below). Under these circumstances,
perspective is insufficient to underwrite feelings
of personal ownership. In what follows I present
both conceptual and empirical arguments in
support of the need to posit a separate mecha-
nism that enables consciousness to take owner-
ship of its intentional objects.
Before proceeding let me be very clear on
an important point. My interest is in the
mechanisms that sanction an individual’s
feeling of epistemic authority in questions of
personal ownership. As will be see in “Func-
tional Independence of Content and Owner-
ship: The Experienced Loss of Personal Own-
ership in Cases of Clinical Pathology” and
“Functional Independence of Content and
Ownership: The Experienced Loss of Per-
sonal Ownership in Cases of Nonclinical Pa-
thology,” a person may be confused or mis-
taken about the origins of his or her mental
states. But, from a (bio)logical perspective,
those states belong to the individual, whether
s/he knows it or not: They are the products of
his or her mind. In this article I am concerned
with the former sense of personal owner-
ship—that is, the mechanisms that enable a
person to take noninferential possessory cus-
tody of mental states that, of ontological ne-
cessity, are authored by the person (though
s/he might no longer know it).
Key Terms and Their Definitions
Because readers are likely to be unfamiliar
with terms such as personal and perspectival
ownership (concepts seldom voiced outside cer-
tain Eastern philosophical traditions; e.g., Alba-
hari, 2006), I first explain what I have in mind
for some of the terms that play a central role in
this article. Although not everyone will agree
with my definitions, this exercise should leave
little doubt about the meanings I intend. In what
follows, several terms and their (perhaps idio-
syncratic) meanings are presented in approxi-
mate order of their appearance in the text.
Consciousness
Consciousness is a topic whose explication
(much less existence) has been the target of
scholarly discourse for thousands of years. De-
spite the optimistic claims of some (e.g., emer-
gent materialists), continuing struggles with this
topic show little evidence of any imminent res-
olution. Analysis of consciousness has im-
pressed upon investigators the need to partition
the term into a variety of types and subtypes—
for example, access consciousness, phenomenal
consciousness, state consciousness, primary con-
sciousness, temporal consciousness, core con-
sciousness, reflective consciousness, primary
consciousness, sentience, noetic awareness, auto-
noetic awareness, creature consciousness, higher
order thought, pure consciousness, self-awareness,
and so forth.
Although I appreciate the conceptual utility
of many of these designations, my use of the
term “consciousness” consists in the proposi-
tion that X is a state of consciousness if and
only if there is “something it is like” for the
organism to be in that state (e.g., Nagel, 1974).
That is, consciousness, as I use the term, con-
sists in first-person subjectivity. This usage is
what most philosophers have in mind when
discussing phenomenal consciousness (e.g.,
Chalmers, 1996; Strawson, 2009a), although a
precise definition of “what it is like to be in a
particular state” has proven to be notoriously
difficult (e.g., Block, 1995). Phenomenal con-
sciousness is perhaps best understood from the
perspective of personal acquaintance (e.g., Rus-
sell, 1912/1999; for discussion, see “Two Paths
to Knowledge” below).
Mental States and Mind
A mental state consists in representational
content (i.e., an intentional object) and its con-
scious apprehension. The resulting mental states
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are individuated by both the properties of the
intentional object (e.g., facts, images, proposi-
tions) and features associated with the type of
consciousness to which content is presented (as
noted, in this article I will be concerned primar-
ily with phenomenal consciousness). For exam-
ple, the same content (e.g., information about
one’s home) can result in the mental state of
episodic recollection (when the intentional ob-
ject is conjoined with autonoetic consciousness)
or of knowledge (when it is apprehended by
noetic consciousness). Mental states comprise
the great variety of psychological faculties fa-
miliar to both academic discourse and personal
phenomenology (e.g., attitudes, belief, memory,
imagination, thought, inference, etc.; for discus-
sion, see Klein, 2015b).
Importantly, a mental state is the subjectively
experienced outcome of subexperiential pro-
cesses taking place in the brain. These subex-
periential processes consist in various learned
and inherited subroutines and decision rules
(e.g., Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance,
2002) that act on stored content to enable the
judgments, thoughts, inferences, plans, deci-
sions, and so forth we experience as (and enact
in virtue of) our mental states. Although subex-
periential processes are necessary preconditions
for having a mental state, they are nonmental:
They are the neural mechanisms that enable
experience, not the experience itself. They con-
ceivably could go on without there being any
subjective experience. An analogy may help:
While a play consists in a great many behind the
scenes activities (securing funding, finding a
venue, etc.), strictly speaking, none of these
activities is the play itself. On this view, the
mind is the collection of subexperiential pro-
cesses required for having a mental state and the
mental states that they enable.1
Personal and Perspectival Ownership
By personal ownership I mean that one’s
experiences are felt as belonging to oneself. The
appropriation of the content of experience to
one’s self is noninferential and prereflective
(i.e., directly given as “mine”). In James’ (1890)
colorful terms, personal ownership is accompa-
nied by the feeling that one’s experiential con-
tent is imbued with a sense of warmth and
intimacy.
Given the effortless manner in which the felt
ownership of mental states typically unfolds, we
seldom are aware an ownership relation be-
tween consciousness and its content needs to be
forged. However, as we will see in “Functional
Independence of Content and Ownership: The
Experienced Loss of Personal Ownership in
Cases of Clinical Pathology” and “Functional
Independence of Content and Ownership: The
Experienced Loss of Personal Ownership in
Cases of Nonclinical Pathology” below, in cer-
tain clinical conditions (e.g., depersonalization,
thought insertion, somatoparaphrenia), inten-
tional objects can be present in awareness, yet
lack the feeling that they are owned by con-
sciousness. When this occurs, the content that
serves as the intentional object is treated as alien
to the self. Even when the afflicted individual
accepts that he or she must have authored the
phenomenologically unowned content (e.g., al-
though I acknowledge that I produced the
thought in my head, it is not mine. I was forced
to think it by an alien, divine intervention, or the
mind control machine in the basement of the
CIA), the content is accompanied by nagging
feelings of personal disconnectedness (see
“Functional Independence of Content and Own-
ership: The Experienced Loss of Personal Own-
ership in Cases of Clinical Pathology” and
“Functional Independence of Content and Own-
ership: The Experienced Loss of Personal Own-
ership in Cases of Nonclinical Pathology” be-
low).
In these ways, the ordinarily hidden relation
between experienced content and personal own-
ership, in virtue of it absence, is thrust into
view. Personal ownership can be seen as the
“mental glue” that experientially binds the two
core properties of a mental state (content and its
conscious apprehension; see “Mental States and
Mind” above) into a sense of oneness (i.e., my
content).
In contrast, perspectival ownership of one’s
mental states is not a directly given, prereflec-
tive aspect of occurrent experience. Rather, it is
based on inferential knowledge—specifically,
1 Great care must be exercised here. Cerebral blood flow
and neuro-cellular metabolism also are subexperiential pro-
cesses whose integrity is essential to having a mental state.
But it would seem a conceptual over-reach to classify such
things as aspects of mind. Boundaries need to be drawn, but
the borders (at present) are far from clear.
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knowledge that my mental states appear in a
manner different from that in which they appear
to anyone else—that is, they are in my head.
Content present to experience in this manner
does not guarantee the experiencer will (or can)
assume ownership of the content (see “Func-
tional Independence of Content and Ownership:
The Experienced Loss of Personal Ownership
in Cases of Clinical Pathology” and “Functional
Independence of Content and Ownership: The
Experienced Loss of Personal Ownership in
Cases of Nonclinical Pathology” below).
In sum, what individuates a mental state as
distinctly and exclusively my own is that I in-
tuitively sense—without a need for intuition,
inference, or reflection—that the content of that
mental state is uniquely and infallibly my con-
tent (for detailed discussions, see Albahari,
2006; Klein, 2012, 2013; Lane, 2012, 2014;
Shoemaker, 1984; Zahavi, 2011). This form of
ownership is the focus of the present article.
Functional Independence
The contention that two processes, systems,
or mechanisms (i.e., X and Y) are functionally
independent does not imply that X has nothing
to do with Y or that they are completely sepa-
rate. Rather, as Tulving (1983, p. 66), discuss-
ing systems of memory, explains, functional
independence means that “one system can op-
erate independently of the other, though not
necessarily as efficiently as it could with the
support of the other intact system.” In this arti-
cle, I attempt to demonstrate that consciousness
and its intentional objects are functionally inde-
pendent: Although their joint presence is nec-
essary for having a mental state, consciousness
and content are not ontologically coextensive.
A Brief look at the Basic Model, Its
Implications for Personal Ownership, and
the Organization of the Argument for
Personal Ownership
A core connection of this paper is that a
mental state is the experienced outcome of the
conjoining of content and consciousness. Al-
though the mental states that result from this
interaction are determined by subexperiential
(primarily neuro-cognitive; but see footnote 1)
activity, these are preconditions for the state,
not the state itself. That is, there is no mental
state (e.g., memory, knowledge, imagination,
belief, etc.) until content is made available to,
and apprehended by, consciousness (e.g., Klein,
2012, 2015a; Neuhouser, 1990). In this sense,
the commonly held assumption that there are
subexperiential systems capable of being desig-
nated as, say, memory or imagination is called
into question.
This is not to say there are no neural modules
(in the Fodorian, sense; e.g., Fodor, 1983) with
dedicated functions at the subexperiential level.
Rather, the argument is that the output of those
modules remains state-neutral until it is acted on
by consciousness. Thus, the same subexperien-
tial system may play role in movements that
enable “swinging a golf club” or “reenacting a
hole-in-one.” But the output of that system does
not become “an athletic performance” or “a
behavioral manifestation of memory” until it
becomes the intentional object of conscious-
ness.
An example may help. Consider the mental
state we call “memory.” To experience a mem-
ory is to experience the product(s) of a sequence
of subexperiential processes (e.g., encoding,
storage and retrieval). But memory is not coex-
tensive with these subexperiential processes.
Rather, the outcome of subexperiential process-
ing “becomes” memory only when the content it
produces is taken by consciousness in a specific
way (for fuller discussion, see Klein, 2013,
2015b).
For example, depending in part on the con-
text in which the object is given to conscious-
ness, the same content could be experienced as
imagination, thought, belief, and so forth (for a
detailed discussion see Klein, 2015b). On this
view, there are no subexperiential systems spe-
cifically dedicated to specific types of memory:
The type of memory experience one has (e.g.,
episodic or semantic) is realized only once con-
sciousness takes state-neutral content in a par-
ticular way (e.g., autonoetically or noetically).
We thus need to distinguish the preconditions
that enable first-person experience from the ex-
perience itself. Before being associated with a
particular form of consciousness under particu-
lar circumstances, stored content is state-
neutral—that is, it is agnostic with regard to the
mental state in which it will participate: The
same content can eventuate in the mental states
we call imagination, thought, planning, belief,
attitude, hope, and so on, as well as in memory.
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(To avoid potential confusion, let me be clear
that the individuation of a mental state as, say,
a memory, thought or a belief is a function of a
variety of factors—including, but not limited to,
the nature of the intentional object as well as the
type of consciousness and the subexperiential
routines enacted on the intentional object. Per-
sonal ownership enables one to experience pos-
sessory custody of a mental state: It is not a
determining factor in the type of state experi-
enced.)
Recently I have argued that a model of
mind—in which the notion of preexisting neural
networks dedicated to producing specific men-
tal states is replaced by the view that subexpe-
riential processes produce state-neutral content
that is psychologically individuated (e.g., as
memory, thought, imagination) only after being
acted on by consciousness—can help us better
understand both memorial (e.g., Klein, 2013,
2015b) and self-referential (e.g., Klein, 2012,
2014a) experience. Although a detailed treat-
ment of this model would take us far from of
our goal (i.e., making the case for a mechanism
of personal ownership), in the next section I
briefly discuss the core constituents of a mental
state (content and consciousness). A rudimen-
tary understanding of the way in which these
components relate to each other provides the
conceptual scaffolding necessary to support the
arguments I subsequently advance for a mech-
anism of personal ownership.
A basic understanding of the ontological
commitments of these constituents also will
help us appreciate the methods and procedures
required to tackle the complex issue of how
mental states are known (“Mental States” be-
low). In “Functional Independence of Content
and Ownership: The Experienced Loss of Per-
sonal Ownership in Cases of Clinical Pathol-
ogy” and “Functional Independence of Content
and Ownership: The Experienced Loss of Per-
sonal Ownership in Cases of Nonclinical Pa-
thology” below, I draw on these methods to
document what happens when the mechanisms
supporting feelings of personal ownership go
wrong. Finally, I discuss some implications of
these findings and suggest several domains in
which a theory of personal ownership might
help us make sense of puzzling clinical phe-
nomena.
Mental States: Consciousness and Its
Intentional Objects
Although it is well-beyond the scope of this
article to provide a detailed treatment of the
relation between content and consciousness,
suffice it to say that, on the basis of both current
empiricism and rational analysis, these two as-
pects of mind cannot be deduced from, or re-
duced to, a single, underlying principle, struc-
ture, process, substance, or system (e.g., Earle,
1972; Klein, 2012, 2014a; Nagel, 2012; Straw-
son, 2009a; Zahavi, 2005). One—the subexpe-
riential processes that eventuate in the content
presented to consciousness—are materially
(primarily neural) instantiated, and therefore
can, at least in principle, be objectified and
quantified (e.g., Klein, 2012, 2014a). Accord-
ingly, the processes responsible for the content
of consciousness are capable of being treated as
objects of scientific inquiry.
The other—first-person subjectivity—is the
aspect of mind that experiences the intentional
objects made available. It thus is the subject,
rather than the object, of experience. As will be
argued below, subjectivity cannot directly be
known by acts of inference or analysis. Knowl-
edge of our personal subjectivity is not some-
thing that can adequately be captured by prop-
ositional truths (i.e., descriptive analysis); rather
it is a matter of direct acquaintance (e.g., Earle,
1972; Kant, 1998; S. Klein, 2012; McGinn,
2004; Robinson, 2008; Nagel, 1974; Russell,
1912/1999).
These considerations have important conse-
quences for mental states as the focus of scien-
tific inquiry. As introductory texts on psychol-
ogy and neuroscience make abundantly clear,
considerable progress has been made describing
the subexperiential bases of mental states. This
is because such mechanisms can be objectified
and quantified, thus rendering them amenable to
scientific analysis (at least what remains of them
following conceptual reduction; e.g., Klein,
2015a). By contrast, consciousness still is too
poorly understood to provide the definitional
clarity required to situate it securely within a
descriptive framework. Indeed, the difficulties
encountered have left some wondering whether
a satisfying conceptual treatment is possible in
practice or in principle (e.g., Husserl, 1964;
McGinn, 1991, 2004; Klein, 2014a; Nagel,
2012; Robinson, 2008).
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Not surprisingly, researchers (intentionally or
otherwise) often attempt to side-step these dif-
ficulties by relying on readers’ familiarity with
terms such as “consciousness” and “subjectiv-
ity” (derived from years of knowledge by ac-
quaintance; see subsection “Two Paths to
Knowledge”) to confer a sense of confidence
that he or she knows what it is to which the
researcher refers. But the problem remains:
Careful analysis of the epistemological warrant
of a purely theoretical rendition of first-person
subjectivity reveals we largely are in the dark
concerning what it is we are referring to when
we attempt to describe what we mean by the
word “consciousness” (e.g., Klein, 2012;
McGinn, 2004; Robinson, 2008; Russell, 1913/
1992; Varela et al., 1993).
Equally problematic, any attempt to treat
consciousness as the object of scientific scrutiny
has the consequence of stripping it of its core
feature—its subjectivity (e.g., Earle, 1972;
Klein, 2012, 2014a, 2015a; Robinson, 2008;
Midgley, 2014). When objectivity2 is the stance
adopted by subjectivity to study itself—that is,
when consciousness takes itself as its inten-
tional object—subjectivity must, of logical ne-
cessity, be directed toward some “other” that
serves as its object (e.g., Earle, 1972; Husserl,
1964; Klein, 2012; Neuhouser, 1990; Rossman,
1991; Zahavi, 2005). Thus, to study first-person
experience as an object, one first must transform
it into a third-person entity.
Paradoxically, the subjective aspect of the
mind can achieve objectivity only at the cost of
forfeiting its essence as the mind’s subjective
center (e.g., Earle, 1955; Gallagher & Zahavi,
2008; Klein, 2012; Varela, Thompson, & Ro-
sch, 1993). Once apprehended as an object by
first-person subjectivity (one’s own or that of
another), consciousness becomes an object in
the manner all objects (mental and physical)
become when objectified and quantified (e.g.,
Husserl, 1964; Klein, 2014a; Neuhouser, 1990).
In the process, the subjective core of the first-
person experience is lost.
Science trades in the world of publically ob-
servable and physically measureable objects
and events (e.g., Earle, 1955; Hanson, 1958,
1971; Margenau, 1950; Rescher, 1984, 1997).
Bridging laws—which, despite attracting the
critical attention of philosophers (e.g., Hempel,
1965), continue to have considerable traction in
psychology (e.g., Klee, 1997)—play an impor-
tant role in this enterprise, providing a theoretic
device by which investigators construct logi-
cally defensible mappings of observables to the-
ory (e.g., Klee, 1997; Ladyman, 2002; Mar-
genau, 1950). But, as we have seen, for
consciousness to become part of scientific in-
quiry, it first has to relinquish its subjectivity.
To maintain its integrity, subjectivity cannot be
transformed into an object (e.g., Husserl, 1964;
Kant, 1998; Klein, 2012; Rossman, 1991; Za-
havi, 2005; but see Strawson, 2009b, for a dis-
senting view). Yet, absent objective instantia-
tion, bridging laws lack conceptual warrant,
making it is hard to see how scientifically de-
fensible questions about mental states can be
formulated.
So, How Can We Know Our Mental
States? Two Paths to Knowledge
If reducing first-person experience to objec-
tive, quantifiable properties strips it of its sub-
jectivity, how might one come to know the
phenomenological realization of subexperien-
tial activity? In earlier articles, I have suggested
that Russell’s (1912/1999, 1913/1992) distinc-
tion between two forms of knowledge—that by
acquaintance and that by description—offers a
potentially productive way of exploring the
mental aspects of mind (consciousness and its
objects) without having to (a) prioritize one
form of knowing over the other, or (b) affect a
conceptual reduction in which all properties of
mind are forced to fit a single mode of knowing
(e.g., Klein, 2010; Klein & Gangi, 2010; see
also McGinn, 2004).
Knowledge by acquaintance amounts to di-
rect contact (perceptual or introspective) with
things of which we are aware. To borrow Na-
gel’s (1974) provocative phrase, we know our
mental states by our acquaintance with “what it
feels like” to have those states. There is no need
for intermediary steps such as “processes of
inference or any knowledge of truths.” (Russell,
1912/1999, p. 25). Nor are such steps epistemo-
logically justifiable—since they have the con-
sequence of reducing the aspect of reality under
2 Objectivity is based on the assumption that an act or
object exists independent of any one person’s awareness of
it (e.g., Earle, 1955; Martin, 2008; Nagel, 1974; Rescher,
1997). That is, it is something other than the self.
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investigation into a shadow of itself (e.g., Klein,
2015a; McGinn, 2004; Midgley, 2014).
Knowledge by description, in contrast, con-
sists in the formulation of propositional “truths”
about objects of inquiry. Although we can at-
tempt to reduce our mental states to such for-
malizations (as many have; e.g., Blackmore,
2004; Edelman & Tononi, 2000; Marcel & Bi-
siach, 1988; Weber & Weekes, 2009), doing so
runs the serious risk of stripping consciousness
of its phenomenological essence (e.g., Chalm-
ers, 1996; Earle, 1955; Klein, 2015a; Nagel,
2012; Midgley, 2014; Robinson, 2008). Put dif-
ferently, a purely conceptual analysis of expe-
rience, no matter how well crafted, is a dis-
course about, not a rendering of, experience
(Klein, 2015a; Varela et al., 1993).
In sum, our knowledge of our mental states is
based on our direct acquaintance with them:
There is “something it is like” to have a mental
state. On this point, Russell is adamant: It is
only in virtue of knowledge by acquaintance
that we know our mental states (see also,
McGinn, 2004). Although we can propose con-
ceptual “truths” about aspects of those states,
this analytic reduction renders the target of the
reduction less-than-whole (e.g., Gallagher &
Zahavi, 2008; Klein, 2015a). As Varela et al.
(1993) observe, “When it is cognition or mind
that is being examined, the dismissal of experi-
ence becomes untenable, even paradoxical. . . .
To deny the truth of our own experience in the
scientific study of ourselves is not only unsat-
isfactory; it is to render the scientific study of
ourselves without a subject matter” (pp. 13–14).
With mental states, experience (by acquain-
tance) comes first.
Using Knowledge by Acquaintance to
Explore the Mind
Knowledge by acquaintance thus provides
the palate we use to give color, form, and tex-
ture to our experiential landscape—a depiction
not capable of full realization from a purely
theoretical stance (e.g., Jackson, 1986; Russell,
1912/1999; Varela et al., 1993; Wallace, 2003).
There simply is no other way to reliably know
what a mental state, qua mental state, fully
entails (e.g., Gertler, 2011; Jackson, 1986;
Klein, 2015a; McGinn, 2004; Russell, 1912/
1999).
This is not to say we have first-person access
to all the processes and mechanisms (many of
which operate outside awareness) logically re-
quired to support our mental states. In many
(perhaps most) cases we do not (e.g., Nisbett &
Wilson, 1977). But we do have a privileged
relation with the experienced outcomes of the
subexperiential workings of mind. Accordingly,
if you want to know about mental states, knowl-
edge by acquaintance offers the only experien-
tially defensible picture of its contours and col-
ors. Reduction to mathematical formulas,
propositional “truths,” and other currently prac-
ticed tools of scientific objectification does
more to obscure than to reveal the phenomenon
of interest.
Knowledge by Acquaintance: The Use of
Introspective Techniques
Strategies for treating experience as an irre-
ducible, but knowable, aspect of reality already
are available (though underutilized). Perhaps
the most promising approach—sustainable
within the context of our current methodologi-
cal sophistication—relies on our uniquely hu-
man ability to introspect and put into words our
acquaintance with our mental states.
Although introspective techniques have long
been held to suffer from a variety of interpretive
and methodological difficulties (for review and
discussion, see Ericsson & Simon, 1985), in
recent years many of these concerns success-
fully have been addressed (e.g., Brewer, 1994;
Hurlburt, 1990; Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel,
2007). Accordingly, the use of introspective
reports as a reliable and informative source of
information about mental states has seen a re-
surgence over the past few decades (e.g., in
domains such as autobiographical memory, self,
consciousness, and temporal self-projection;
e.g., Conway, Rubin, Spinnler, & Wagenaar,
1992; Fivush & Haden, 2003; Hurlburt, 1993;
Klein, 2012; Nelson, 1989; Race, Keane, &
Verfaellie, 2011). This is attributable, in large
part, to the unique perspective introspective
data provide—that is, an empirically sanctioned
and logically defensible vantage point from
which to observe mental reality in the fullness
in which it is given to experience (e.g., Klein,
2015a). Although translation of experience into
words clearly has limitations, this currently is
the best way to go when attempting to study the
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experiential aspects of reality (e.g., Hurlburt &
Schwitzgebel, 2007; Klein, 2014a).
Personal Ownership: A Relation Between
Consciousness and Its Intentional Objects
In what follows, I make the case for a criti-
cally important, but conceptually underappreci-
ated, relation between consciousness and its
content. Specifically, I present evidence in sup-
port of the proposition that the mere presence of
an intentional object in consciousness is not
sufficient for that object to be felt as personally
owned. What is needed is a mechanism by
which the intentional object and consciousness
are placed in an ownership relation, resulting in
the prereflective feeling that the object I expe-
rience is “my” object.
Evidential support for this contention comes
primarily from consideration of cases in which
the ownership relation is compromised. Under
these circumstances, the intentional object, de-
spite occupying a unique position with respect
to its conscious apprehension (i.e., it is in my
head), no longer is experienced as personally
owned. Although, at first blush, this may seem
incoherent (after all, how can my consciousness
take as its object content that is not also my
own?), its plausibility is secured by the idea (see
Sections “A Brief Look at the Basic Model . . .”
and “Mental States”) that mental content is con-
ceptually agnostic before being taken as an in-
tentional object (e.g., Klein, 2013, 2015b). Sub-
experiential state-neutrality implies that prior to
assuming the status of intentional object, con-
tent does not belong to any mental state, includ-
ing the one we refer to as self (for recent dis-
cussions of the self, see Klein, 2012; Prebble,
Addis, & Tippett, 2013). On this view, personal
ownership is not an intrinsic property of the
intentional object3; rather, ownership requires
that consciousness relate to its object in a par-
ticular, self-referential way (e.g., Klein, 2013,
2014b, c; Klein & Nichols, 2012; Lane, 2012).
This, of course, opens the door to the possi-
bility that, as a result of disruption of the mech-
anisms underwriting prereflective feelings of
personal ownership, content mistakenly may be
attributed to someone or something other than
the self (e.g., Talland, 1964). Even when as-
pects of content—for example, facts about one-
self—enable one to infer personal possession
(see “Functional Independence of Content and
Ownership” below), inference-based ownership
fails to afford the clarity and certitude provided
by noninferential mechanisms of personal be-
longing (e.g., Klein, 2014c; Zemach, 1983).
An Argument for the Need to Posit a
Mechanism Capable of Forging an
Ownership Relation Between Mental
Content and Consciousness Based on a
Reconstruction of the Hominid Mind
Arguments in support of a mechanism en-
abling one to feel ownership of one’s mental
states are uncommon in psychology. The prin-
ciple exception is found in literature on clinical
conditions such as schizophrenic thought inser-
tion and depersonalization (see “Functional In-
dependence of Content and Ownership” below).
Perhaps the only sustained discussion of per-
sonal ownership outside the clinical context is
Jaynes’ (1976) speculative interpretation of
documents and artifacts dating back thousands
of years. Based on his reading of the evidence,
Jaynes concludes that the human mind, for
much of its evolutionary history, did not con-
sistently take its mental states (in particular,
thoughts) as personally owned. Rather, our an-
cestors sometimes attributed such content to
external agents—most often deities and de-
mons.
Thinking leaves no fossil record. Accordingly,
Jaynes’ reconstructive analysis is susceptible to
the claim that it represents little more than a very
clever, but unwarranted, reading of the historical
record. However, an analysis of the introspective
reports of present-day individuals suffering from
(a variety of) psychological dysfunctions provides
backing for Jaynes’ basic position (though not
necessarily the mechanisms he proposed to ac-
count for the hypothesized decoupling of content
and ownership).
Functional Independence of Content and
Ownership: The Experienced Loss of
Personal Ownership in Cases of
Clinical Pathology
In this section, I draw on patients’ introspec-
tive reports to bolster my argument for a mech-
3 Formally, X is an intrinsic property of Y if Y’s having
the property X does not consist in Y also having a relation
Z to something else.
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anism that enables consciousness to take its
intentional objects as personally owned. In
(most of) the cases discussed, content remains
present to consciousness, but the feeling that
this content is “mine” no longer is present. That
is, despite maintaining a clear sense of hosting a
mental state (i.e., perspectival ownership), that
state is not experienced as belonging to oneself.
Such findings lend considerable support to
the inference that an intentional object can exist
alongside (within?) first-person subjectivity, yet
not be felt as owned. Though ownership may
subsequently be inferred from considerations of
perspective or from information contained
within the intentional object, these inferences
are less than convincing to the person making
the inference. As will be seen below, the loss of
direct, noninferential feelings of ownership is
highly confusing and occasionally traumatic
(for reviews, see Albahari, 2006; Klein & Nich-
ols, 2012; Lane, 2012; Stephens & Graham,
2000).
In the next subsection I show how a number
of distinct clinical phenomena acquire concep-
tual coherence when viewed as disruptions of
personal ownership. However, while such data
support the need to posit a mechanism capable
of underwriting the ownership relation, the ev-
idence presented is not free of controversy. Ac-
cordingly, in subsection “Functional Indepen-
dence of Content and Ownership: The
Experienced Loss of Personal Ownership in
Cases of Nonclinical Pathology,” I present ex-
amples of ownership pathology less susceptible
to interpretive ambiguity. Although such “pure”
cases are few in number (at least at present; e.g.,
Klein, 2012; Lane, 2012), their scarcity is more
than compensated by the conceptual clarity they
provide.
Evidence from frontal lobotomy.
Psychosurgery in the form of prefrontal lobot-
omy consists in the surgical ablation of path-
ways linking the thalamus with parts of the
frontal lobes (e.g., Freeman & Watts, 1942).
Although no longer practiced—it was con-
ducted from the late 1930s through the early
1970s—its intent was to relieve patients of men-
tal disorders that had been found resistant to
what, at the time, were standard treatments.
In the days after surgical intervention, pa-
tients would report experiencing a reduction of
premorbid symptoms (e.g., anxiety, depres-
sion), while showing no apparent decline in
general intelligence or cognitive function. Per-
sonality remained largely intact, and the ability
to recall the personal past was mostly unaf-
fected (though patients often commented that
they did not think of their past as often as they
had before surgery).
One consequence of the procedure—particu-
larly relevant for our discussion—was the effect
it had on patients’ feelings of self-concern (e.g.,
Robinson & Freeman, 1954): Postsurgically,
patients reported little or no interest in either
their current or future circumstances. Some ex-
perienced a form of depersonalization (see sub-
section “Evidence From Depersonalization”), in
which boundaries between self and nonself
were experienced as fuzzy or, in some cases,
lost entirely (e.g., Freeman & Watts, 1942).
Feelings of the self as a temporal continuant
(i.e., personal diachronicity) also were reduced
or eliminated (although the concept of personal
diachronicity remained intact; e.g., Robinson &
Freeman, 1954).
These findings sanction the inference that
lobotomy patients’ personally relevant experi-
ence consists in largely (though not completely;
e.g., the loss of diachronicity) intact access to
self-referential content, paired with a lack of
concern for, or an interest in, that content. This
dissociation between the experience of, and
concern about, one’s intentional objects, al-
though not identical to loss of ownership, cer-
tainly is suggestive. However, before pursuing
an analogy between concern and ownership, it
is important to recognize that the data presented
are based almost entirely on clinical anecdote
and observations collected for purposes far
afield from questions of personal ownership.
Moreover, although it appears reasonable to as-
sume that the absence of self-concern reflects
the patient’s failure to take the content of aware-
ness as personally owned, such an assumption is
not logically mandated. In short, although find-
ings from patients undergoing prefrontal lobot-
omy for the relief of psychopathological disor-
ders are suggestive, they do not license strong
inferences about loss of ownership.
More germane to questions of personal own-
ership is a particular aspect of the psychosurgi-
cal process—the finding that surgery often al-
tered patients’ reactions to pain without
changing their ability to experience pain. That
is, although lobotomy patients did not lose the
sensation of pain, they experienced relief from
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the anguish such sensations typically cause
(e.g., Freeman & Watts, 1946, 1948). As a
result of this serendipitous finding, psychosur-
gery was adopted as a medical procedure for
alleviating the suffering associated with chronic
organic pain (e.g., JAMA, 1950; Freeman &
Watts, 1946, 1948; Murphy, 1951; Nemiah,
1962; for review and critical discussion, see
Raz, 2009). Because this procedure most often
was conducted on individuals lacking attendant
psychopathology (e.g., schizophrenia), these
data are not subject to the interpretive issues
arising from concerns about the effects of co-
morbidity on introspective offerings (see Sec-
tion “Evidence From Thought Insertion”). Ac-
cordingly, they are better suited to providing an
untainted view of the relation between content
(i.e., pain) and personal ownership than are data
obtained from reports of patients undergoing
psychosurgery to alleviate symptoms of psy-
chopathology.
The results of psychosurgery were relatively
clear—patients simultaneously experienced
pain while distancing themselves from the pain
experience. This, in turn, is consistent with
(though not demanding of) the inference that
what is taking place in these individuals is not
the absence of experienced content, but failure
to imbue that content with a feeling of personal
attachment. (Some may wonder whether hyp-
notic treatment of chronic pain warrants a sim-
ilar interpretation. It does not. In the standard
treatment of pain by hypnosis, what is changed
the intensity of experience of pain, rather than
attachment to that experience; e.g., Jensen &
Patterson, 2006).
Although instructive, studies of the effects of
psychosurgery on pain were not designed with
the purpose of testing personal ownership. Ac-
cordingly, one must exercise considerable cau-
tion drawing inferences from the data. Although
it seems reasonable to interpret these findings as
a disruption between content and ownership, the
data require a considerable number of assump-
tions before such conclusions emerge.
Evidence from thought insertion. Evidence
more directly in support of the idea that the
feeling of ownership can be disrupted by psy-
chopathology is found in the literature on
schizophrenia. Of particular bearing is the phe-
nomenon of thought insertion. Individuals ex-
periencing thought insertion report that there is
a thought in their head that they did not volun-
tarily produce: That is, they do not take the
thoughts as their own (e.g., Bortolotti &
Broome, 2009; Campbell, 2002; Frith, 1992;
Hoerl, 2001; Martin & Pacherie, 2013; for a
review see Stephens & Graham, 2000).
Unfortunately, the experiences of schizo-
phrenic patients’ often are delusional (e.g.,
Bleuler, 1911/1950; David & Cutting, 1994;
Frith, 1992). A delusion, roughly speaking, is a
belief maintained without due sensitivity to the
evidence for or against it, and without appropri-
ate regard for the causes of the belief or for the
consequences of holding it. This leaves reports
of individuals suffering thought insertion open
to the objection that the reported experiences
are tainted, to some indeterminate degree, by
aspects of psychopathology having little, if any-
thing, directly to do with the experience of
ownership. For example, a person suffering
thought insertion may feel that a thought present
in awareness is his or her own, but, as a conse-
quence of a delusional mandate (or heightened
self-protective concerns), be unwilling to pub-
lically acknowledge the content as “mine.” Ac-
cordingly, such data, though, on the surface,
consistent with the argument for a mechanism
of personal ownership, cannot, by themselves,
provide closure.
Evidence from anosognosia. Anosognosia
is a well-documented pathology in which pa-
tients experience problems with memory, lan-
guage, perception, or voluntary movement, but
show either no awareness of the deficit or fail to
acknowledge the deficit as their own (e.g.,
Babinski, 1914; McGlynn & Kaszniak, 1991;
Mograbi, Brown, & Morris, 2009; for reviews
see McGlynn & Schacter, 1989 and Prigatano &
Schacter, 1991).4 While ansoagnosia can impact
any part or parts of the body, for expositional
convenience I restrict focus on its effects on
bodily appendages. However, my arguments,
with minor emendations, apply to anosagnosia
in its broadest realizations.
From an ownership perspective, one wants to
know what such patients make of their own
behavior—given that they clearly can perceive
the affected appendage, but don’t acknowledge
4 It is important to understand that these patients are not
in denial of their deficits or indifferent to them (when a
patient acknowledges a deficit but seems untroubled by it,
the syndrome is called anosodiaphoria).
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its deficits (e.g., Ansell & Bucks, 2006; Ataria,
2015; De Vignemont, 2007). Some patients at-
tribute their inability to move a body part to
arthritis or rheumatism; others, when asked to
move an affected limb, appear distracted, move
the unaffected limb, or respond that they have
moved the affected limb, when in fact they have
not (this happens even when the patient looks
directly at the affected limb during examina-
tion).
Explanations can become bizarre or delu-
sional. For example, a patient may claim that
the affected limb is not his or her own, but
rather belongs to someone else—for example, it
was forgotten by a previous patient or belongs
to someone lying by their side. One woman,
studied by Bisiach and Geminiani (1991), was
anosognosic for her hemiplegia. She claimed
that her left hand did not belong to her; rather,
it had been left in the ambulance by another
patient. Another hemiplegic patient stated that
his left arm belonged to the examiner. When the
examiner placed the patient’s left hand between
his own arm and hands, the patient continued to
deny that his arm was his own and attributed
three arms and three hands to the examiner!
Viewed in terms of pathologies of personal
ownership, these cases suggest a relatively un-
compromised apprehension of the intentional
object (e.g., an intact ability to mentally repre-
sent the affected body part—although this con-
tent often is compromised to a degree) existing
alongside intact consciousness (e.g., the ability
to take that content as an object of awareness).
What has come undone is the link that enables
content to be given directly and prereflectively
to the consciousness as “mine”: The person
acknowledges the presence of an “afflicted”
limb, but fails to experience that presence as
indicative of personal ownership. Interestingly,
in some of the cases mentioned, the patient
seems unable to draw on rational inference to
compensate for the loss of felt of ownership
(e.g., the patient who believed the examiner
possessed three hands).
Anosognosia represents a diverse collection
of afflictions, varying both in the bodily (and
mental—e.g., memory; Ansell & Bucks, 2006)
function compromised, and the extent to which
the patient is able to acknowledge the presence
of dysfunction. Although it typically is found in
cases of neural damage or disease, it also occurs
in cases of psychopathology (e.g., dementia,
schizophrenia). Although the former (neural
damage) are not necessarily troubling from an
interpretive standpoint (such damage is not in-
evitably accompanied by comorbidity), the lat-
ter suggest that cases of anosognosia can be
delusional and thus present some of the inter-
pretive difficulties I raised with regard to
thought insertion. In addition, the status of one’s
body image can be partially compromised by
the disorder (e.g., Prigatano & Schacter, 1991),
making it difficult to ascertain the extent to
which the designation of “intact” is an accurate
description of the intentional object.
Evidence from depersonalization. A less
contentious domain within which to seek evi-
dence for the loss of personal ownership is the
psychiatric syndrome known as depersonaliza-
tion (e.g., Reutens, Nielson & Sachdev, 2010;
Sierra & Berrios, 1997; Simeon, 2004; Simeon
& Abugel, 2006). Depersonalization—which
can be transient or chronic—is characterized by
a sense of detachment from one’s self (e.g.,
Guralnik, Schmeidler, & Simeon, 2000; Med-
ford, Sierra, Baker, & David, 2005). As de-
scribed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM 5;
American Psychiatric Association, 2013), per-
sons experiencing depersonalization (a) feel de-
tached from or outside of their body, (b) lack
appropriation or attribution of mental states to
the self, and (c) experience the self as empty
and incomplete (see also Hunter, Phillips, Chal-
der, Sierra, & David, 2003; Sierra & Berrios,
1997; Simeon, 2004; Simeon & Abugel, 2006).
Functional neuroimaging has identified abnor-
mal prefrontal activity in patients experiencing
depersonalization (e.g., Phillips et al., 2001; re-
viewed in Medford et al., 2005), which, taken in
conjunction with the findings from prefrontal lo-
botomy (subsection “Evidence From Frontal Lo-
botomy”), suggests neural substrates in the frontal
cortex may play a role in the experience of loss of
personal ownership (see also footnote 5).
Patients experiencing depersonalization re-
port experiencing a persistent or recurrent sense
of standing apart from both mind and body—
that is, feeling that their body and mental states
do not belong to them. In such cases it appears
that intact self-referential content exists in con-
junction with functioning first-person subjectiv-
ity, albeit a subjectivity bewildered by the ab-
sence of felt ownership of the content of its
experiences. As Albahari (2006, pp. 173–174)
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observes, depersonalized patients “realize there
is something wrong and they wish the state and
its attendant sensation would go away [italics in
original] . . . the negative emotions arise be-
cause the person is in a situation he wishes was
otherwise.” Depersonalized patients thus appear
to evidence an intact content and subjectivity
conjoined with the absence of a feeling of a
personal relation between these two mental state
constituents.
Unfortunately for our purposes, chronic dep-
ersonalization (the more prevalent form of the
disorder) is found primarily in individuals suf-
fering comorbidities such as depression, schizo-
phrenia, anxiety disorders and panic attacks
(e.g., Medford et al., 2005; Reutens et al.,
2010). Research has shown extensive comor-
bidity (in approximately 60% of patients) with
Axis II personality disorders, including border-
line, avoidant personality and obsessive–
compulsive personalities (Simeon, 2004). In
light of these attendant pathologies, testimony
of individuals experiencing depersonalization
inherits much of the same interpretive ambigu-
ity plaguing previously presented cases (e.g.,
thought insertion and anosognosia).
Functional Independence of Content and
Ownership: The Experienced Loss of
Personal Ownership in Cases of
Nonclinical Pathology
Although individuals experiencing psychosur-
gery, thought insertion, anosognosia, and deper-
sonalization report a loss of personal ownership
(e.g., of, pains, thoughts, body image, self-
knowledge), issues of comorbidity render these
findings analytically challenging. However, the
discovery that ostensibly unrelated clinical con-
ditions acquire a degree of interpretive unity
when viewed through the lens of a common
pathology gives credence to the argument that a
mechanism of “personal ownership” has both
epistemological utility and ontological warrant.
Fortunately there exist cases in which loss of
ownership of one’s mental states occurs in the
absence of any apparent psychopathology.
These “pure” or “untainted” cases constitute the
strongest argument for a mechanism that en-
ables consciousness to “own” its intentional ob-
jects. At present, such cases constitute a very
small database (I suspect more will begin to be
reported once “personal ownership” becomes
recognized as a necessary constituent of mind;
see also Lane, 2012). In the following subsec-
tions I present several “pure” cases.
Loss of felt ownership of one’s body due
to neural insult: somatoparaphrenia.
Somatoparaphrenia is a condition in which the
patient, as a consequence of brain damage, de-
nies ownership of contralesional body parts
(e.g., Gerstmann, 1942; Halligan, Marshall, &
Wade, 1995; Nightingale, 1982; Vallar & Ron-
chi, 2009). Feelings of disownership range from
a single limb to an entire side of the body.
Afflicted individuals can visually monitor their
sensory-motor function and form internal repre-
sentations of compromised body parts (e.g., they
do not experience neglect), but they disavow own-
ership of the affected parts. Even if presented
unimpeachable evidence that a limb belongs to
(and is thus is attached to) his or her body, the
patient will typically produce elaborate confabu-
lations to explain away the “facts.” For example,
one patient, on being shown that her disowned
limb remained securely attached to her torso, re-
plied “But my eyes and my feeling don’t agree,
and I must believe my feelings. I know they look
like mine, but I can feel they are not” (Nielsen,
1938, p. 555). In most cases the disorder resolves
over time and unowned mental content (i.e., rep-
resentations of the body) reacquires its status as
“my” content.
In sum, this deficit (though it is often associ-
ated with anosognosia, the two have been
shown to be independent; e.g., Vallar & Ronchi,
2009) is one of personal estrangement from the
content given to awareness. Although the dis-
order is uncommon, its accompanying phenom-
enology clearly shows that the integrity of the
feeling of owning one’s mental states can be
compromised by neural insult (most commonly,
as cases presented in this and previous sections
show, to the frontal and parietal cortices; see
also footnote 5). This, in turn, adds weight to
the argument that a mechanism tasked with
underwriting a sense of personal ownership has
ontological reality.
Loss of ownership of visually-mediated in-
tentional objects. D.P. is a 23-year-old male
who complained of “double vision” (Zahn, Ta-
lazko, & Ebert, 2008). On examination, it was
discovered that D.P. did not actually experience
double vision—rather, he was able to see nor-
mally, but “he did not immediately recognize
that that he was the one who perceives and that
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he needed a second step to become aware the he
himself was the one who perceives the object”
(Zahn et al., 2008, p. 398). This “second step”
consisted in the use of inference—that is, he
relied on personal perspective (i.e., location in
my head) to surmise that his perceptual experi-
ences were his own.
Although diagnosed with right inferior tem-
poral hypometabolism dysfunction of the right
parieto-occiptal junction and precentral cortex,
in all other respects D.P. appeared psychologi-
cally healthy. He suffered no psychosocial
stressors or trauma and socially was well-
adjusted. A structured Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition,
text revision (DSM–IV–TR) interview disclosed
no evidence of psychopathology. Additional
testing revealed normal memory performance,
visual object recognition, lexical retrieval, at-
tention and executive function. Importantly, his
visual perception was unaccompanied by delu-
sion, thought insertion, obsessive doubt, com-
pulsion, or fear. In short, D.P. presented nor-
mally in every regard save one— he
experienced a loss of personal ownership of
visually acquired intentional objects.
D.P.’s pattern of spared and preserved func-
tion is consistent with the proposition that al-
though the content of visual perception was
experienced first-personally, this content no
longer was taken as personally owned. Any
sense of ownership required a “second step”
based on rational reconstruction. D.P.’s intro-
spective reports (which are not subject to by
concerns about comorbidity) thus offer strong
support for an ontological correlate of the hy-
pothesized mechanism of personal ownership.
Shared states but distinct ownership:
Craniopargus. Craniopargus is a rare disor-
der (about 1 in every 2.5 million, relatively few
of whom survive) in which twins are born
joined at the head. In an extremely unusual case
(even by Craniopargus standards), Krista and
Tatiana Hogan’s attachment extended beyond
fused skulls to include a neural bridge connect-
ing the thalamus of one sister to that of the other
(details of the case are reported in Dominus,
2011). In all other respects the twins appear
physically healthy and socially well-adapted
(especially remarkable given the social chal-
lenges they faced). Each girl had her own body
and, despite some volumetric asymmetry be-
tween left and right hemispheres, their neuro-
cognitive function appeared intact (though lag-
ging slightly behind developmental milestones).
Of particular interest are the twins’ reported
experiences of each others’ thoughts and per-
ceptions. Some examples: (a) Tatiana was
handed a toy bird in such a way that only she
could see and touch the toy. Nonetheless, Kris-
tina was able to report that Tatiana had received
a toy bird. (b) When Tatiana was briefly
touched on a bodily location out of her sister’s
line of sight, Kristina could point exactly to the
spot on her sister’s body where the touch oc-
curred.
In short, Kristina can correctly attribute
shared experience (e.g., feeling of possession,
feeling of touch) to her sister (and Tatiana can
do the same). That is, the twins correctly ascribe
occurrent mental states to the person in whom
the states originated. Kristina does not say “I
have a toy bird” or that “I have been touched”;
rather, she says that Tatiana has the toy bird and
Tatiana has been touched. Placed in the context
of the ideas developed in this article, the twins
report conscious apprehension of the same in-
tentional object (which presumably is shared
between them via the thalamic bridge), but per-
sonal ownership of that object is felt as a prop-
erty only of the twin for whom the mental state
has sensory priority.
Because of their age (they were only 4 years
old when covered by the New York Times),
controlled studies of the twins have yet to be
conducted. However, the evidence available is
compelling and consistent with the view that
each twin is capable of being introspectively
aware of the other’s mental states while also
being aware that those states are not her own.
Taken in conjunction with other evidence pre-
sented in “this and the preceding section,” this
finding is in strong opposition to the thesis that
any mental state of which one is introspectively
aware must be felt to be personally possessed
(see also “Philosophical Considerations” be-
low). That is, ownership is not an intrinsic prop-
erty of mental states.
Loss of personal ownership of one’s
memory. This rather unique form of memory
impairment—intact retrieval of learned content
absent a feeling of personal ownership—has, to
my knowledge, previously been documented in
only three cases (although felt loss of memory
ownership occasionally is reported by patients
experiencing depersonalization; e.g., Sierra,
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Baker, Medford, & David, 2005). In one (very
brief) report by Talland, 1964), the patient ex-
amined could accurately report the content of
his memory experiences, but was unable to ex-
perience that content as his own (despite its
subjective location in his head).
A second case (Davidson et al., 2008) con-
sists in its entirety of mention that patient S.M.
(who was part of a group of individuals with
lesions in the parietal cortex—an area often
found compromised in patients suffering loss of
personal ownership) complained that she “often
felt that she did not know where her memories
had come from” (p. 1751). Although consistent
with the proposition that her “memory” prob-
lem consisted in issues of content attribution
rather than content retrieval, the brevity of the
report renders its utility less-than-ideal.
Fortunately, there is a study for which exten-
sive introspective reports are available—the
case of patient R.B. (the details of this case are
summarized herein; fuller treatment can be
found in Klein, 2013, 2014c and Klein & Nich-
ols, 2012). Patient R.B., as a result of a being
struck by a car while riding his bicycle, suffered
severe injuries, including a crushed pelvis and
the fracturing of most of the ribs on the left side
of his torso. In addition to physical trauma, he
experienced several cognitive impairments.
These included mild aphasia and amnesia (both
retrograde and anterograde) for events in tem-
poral proximity to his accident. Performance on
tests of verbal fluency and short-term memory
(STM) fell slightly below scores provided by
neurologically healthy, age-matched controls.
R.B.’s psychological profile, in contrast, pre-
sented a clinically healthy and socially well-
adjusted individual.
While in the hospital, R.B. was placed on
morphine (IV drip, followed by pills) and Oxy-
contin for relief from the considerable pain he
endured. As the intensity of his pain subsided,
he was weaned off medication. Importantly, at
the time of testing R.B. was not on any pain
medication. In addition, his long- and short-
term memory impairments, aphasia, and fluency
deficits had resolved.
However, not all cognitive function returned.
Specifically, although he could intentionally re-
trieve temporally and spatially situated events
that had transpired in his past, those “recollec-
tions” were compromised in a very unusual
manner: The events were unaccompanied by a
sense of personal ownership. That is, R.B. was
able to retrieve personal content from his past,
but, like patient S.M., he did not feel the content
belonged to him. In his own words, they lacked
a sense of “personal ownership”. As an example
(more can be found in Klein & Nichols, 2012),
shortly following his release from the hospital,
R.B. provided the following descriptions of
what it was like for him to remember personal
events:
I did not own any memories that came before my
injury. I knew things that came before my injury. . . .
I could answer any question about where I lived at
different times in my life, who my friends were, where
I went to school, activities I enjoyed. . . . But none of
it was ‘me.’ [although, as he makes clear below, he can
know they are his by an act of inference]
Again:
I could clearly recall a scene of me at the beach in New
London with my family as a child. But the feeling was
that the scene was not my memory . . . the memories
did not in any way feel like they were my memories.
Although R.B. can refer the content of his
occurrent mental states in his past, to do so
requires effortful, inferential processes (under
normal, nonpathological circumstances, such
reference is automatic; e.g., Klein, 2015b). For
example, despite lacking the normal, prereflec-
tive feeling that an occurrent mental state is a
reliving of his past (e.g., Klein, 2013, 2015b;
Tulving, 1985, 2005), R.B. could accept that
this content was “something that should belong
to me.” But, as the following introspective ac-
count makes clear, that knowledge was based
on inferential reasoning rather than felt acquain-
tance:
I can picture the scene perfectly clearly . . . studying
with my friends in our study lounge. But . . . it does not
feel like it was something that really had been a part of
my life. Intellectually I suppose I never doubted that it
was a part of my life. Perhaps because there was such
continuity of memories that fit a pattern that lead up to
the present time. But that in itself did not help change
the feeling of ownership.
He continues:
Having been to MIT had two different issues . . . my
memories of having been at MIT I did not own. Those
scenes of being at MIT were vivid, but they were not
mine. But I owned ‘the fact that I had a degree from
MIT’. . . that might have simply been a matter of
rational acceptance of fact. . . . I remember eating pizza
at XXX in Isla Vista, but the memory belongs to
someone else. But knowing I like pizza, in the present,
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now, is owned by me. When I recall memories from
my past, I intellectually know they are about me. It just
does not feel like it.
Thus, R.B.’s memorial offerings were not
given to consciousness as “mine.” Instead, the
connection had to be forged via conceptual
analysis: He could infer that the content given to
awareness must be from personal past experi-
ences, but he did not know this in virtue of
direct feelings of “mine-ness.” In this regard,
R.B.’s inferential efforts appear analogous to
the ‘second step” used by patient D.P. (Zahn et
al., 2008) to gain an appreciation that objects
present in awareness were his perceptions.
R.B. eventually recovered his ownership
abilities, at which time the same (or largely
similar) content now automatically was taken
by consciousness as a personally owned. This
suggests that it was the mechanism(s) enabling
personal ownership, not the content on which it
acted, that was compromised by neuro-cogni-
tive insult. R.B. describes his recovery of mem-
ory ownership as initially gradual, followed by
abrupt reappropriation:
When I did ‘take ownership’ of a memory, it was
actually quite isolated. A single memory I might own,
yet another memory connected to it I would not own.
It was a startling experience to have no rhyme or
reason to which memories I slowly took ownership of,
one at a time at random over a period of weeks and
months. . . . What happened over the coming months
. . . was interesting. Every once in a while, I would
suddenly think about something in my past and I would
‘own’ it. That was indeed something ‘I’ had done and
experienced. Over time, one by one, I would come to
‘own’ different memories. Eventually, after perhaps
eight months or so, it seemed as if it was all owned
. . . as if once enough individual memories were
owned, it was all owned. For example, the MIT mem-
ory, the one in the lounge . . . I now own it. It’s clearly
part of my life, my past.
It is important to note that during his “un-
owned” period R.B. had no difficulty retrieving
specific, often one-of-a kind, personal experi-
ences (e.g., being on a beach in New London).
He had no trouble representing his body as
being present at those experiences. He knew
that the content in awareness was about him
rather than, say, his mother. And he could call
up, that is, auto-cue (e.g., Donald, 1991), mem-
ories at will. In this sense, his “memories” were
both agentic and self-referential.
However, there appears to be another type of
self-reference that typically accompanies recol-
lection (ownership, mineness) that was im-
paired in his case. His deficit was in represent-
ing, in the first-person, that “I had these
experiences.” That is, his impairment entailed a
loss of the ability to take personal possession of
memory-based objects in awareness.
In summary, in each of the cases presented in
this subsection, the primary constituents of a
mental state (content and consciousness; see
“Mental States” above) appear to maintain their
integrity. However, a specific relation between
these constituent— one of ownership— has
been rendered inoperative, resulting in the ex-
perience of hosting, but not personally owning,
one’s mental states. This, in turn, implies that
personal experience (contra James, Kant and
many others) is not “stamped” with the quality
of “mine-ness” (e.g., Klein, 2013, 2014c). Put
differently, the ownership relationship between
content and consciousness appears to be contin-
gent rather than intrinsic (e.g., Klein, 2013,
2014a, c; Lane, 2012; Zahavi, 2011).
Conclusions
In cases involving disruption of personal
ownership, the “mental glue” that normally ce-
ments consciousness to its content in a relation
of “personal belonging” loses its potency. This
uncoupling, in turn, provides strong evidence
for (a) a theoretical separation between what is
experienced and how it is experienced (as
mine), and (b) the functional independence of
the hypothesized constituents (consciousness
and content) of the ownership relation.
No amount (or quality) of evidence can con-
clusively establish that a postulated entity has
an ontological correlate. However, the number
of cases in which diverse symptoms (e.g.,
thought insertion, somatoparaphrenia, deper-
sonalization, memory disruption), when viewed
through the lens personal ownership, acquire
conceptual coherence strongly suggests that
such a mechanism cannot be dismissed simply
as a misguided failure to heed Occam’s razor—
that is, the stipulation that we admit no more
mechanisms than are deemed minimally neces-
sary to explain a phenomenon. The data are
saying something real and important about the
nature of mind, and the sooner what is being
said is incorporated into our ontology of psy-
chological mechanisms, the sooner we will be
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in a position to treat experiential reality with the
fullness it deserves (e.g., Klein, 2015a).
The phenomenon of “disruption of personal
ownership” also suggests that the hypothesized
constituents of mental states—that is, con-
sciousness and its objects (“Mental States”
above)—have ontological warrant. Ownership
logically entails a two-part relation between the
owner and the owned. The demonstration that
certain individuals experience mental content
absent a feeling that this content belongs to
“me,” shows that this relation can come undone.
And this, in turn, sanctions the conclusion that
consciousness and its content are ontologically
functionally independent aspects of mind.5
Clinical Consideration: Hallucinations,
Flashbacks, and Pain Asymbolia
The notion of “loss of personal ownership”
has implications for understanding clinical dis-
orders other than those addressed in the text: In
particular, both hallucinatory experience (for
reviews, see Bentall, 1990; Freeman & Garety,
2003; Larøi & Woodward, 2007) and PTSD
flashbacks (for reviews see Brewin, Gregory,
Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Ehlers, Hackmann, &
Michael, 2004; Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, &
Clark, 2004) can be viewed, at least in part, as
disruptions of personal ownership. A feature
common to both pathologies is that the object
given to awareness (in hallucinations, most
commonly visual or auditory content; in flash-
backs, content that reflect traumatic events that
played a determinative role in PTSD etiology) is
taken as not being personally owned (in hallu-
cinatory experience, the voices “heard” and
sights “seen” are attributed to sources external
to the experiencing agent; in flashbacks, pa-
tients often experience the flashback as an ac-
tual event taking place now, rather than as a
mental reliving of a previously experienced in-
cident). An argument can be made that what is
common to both pathological experiences is a
failure of the relational mechanisms that prere-
flectively confer a sense of “mineness” on ob-
jects given to awareness.
A similar explanation can be fashioned for
the very rare disorder known as pain asymbolia
(e.g., Berthier, Starkstein, & Leiguarda, 1988;
Rubins & Friedman, 1948; Schilder & Stengel,
1928, 1931; for a recent review see Grahek,
2007). Patients experiencing asymbolia report
that they are aware that they are in pain—that is,
they feel it—but they are indifferent to it. As
Schilder and Stengel (1928) note: “The patient
displays a striking behavior in the presence of
pain. She reacts either not at all or insufficiently
to being pricked, struck with hard objects, and
pinched. She never pulls her arm back energet-
ically or with strength. She never turns the torso
away or withdraws with the body as a whole.
She never attempts to avoid the investigator” (p.
147).
Despite failing to react to pain-inducing stim-
uli, asymbolics recognize what they feel as
pain: “Pricked on the right palm, the patient
smiles joyfully, winces a little, and then says,
‘Oh, pain, that hurts.’ She laughs, and reaches
the hand further toward the investigator and
turns it to expose all sides. . . . The patient’s
expression is one of complacency. The same
reaction is displayed when she is pricked in the
face and stomach” (Schilder & Stengel, 1928, p.
147).
In short, asymbolia patients are both attentive
to and aware of painful stimuli (e.g., Grahek,
2007). What they lack is the affective–
motivational component that normally accom-
panies pain experience: The patient no longer
seems to care (e.g., Lane, 2014). Put into the
language developed in this article, persons ex-
periencing asymbolia know that pains are tak-
ing place in their body, but no longer feel those
pains are their own. Though admittedly specu-
lative, this somewhat unconventional way of
explaining pain asymbolia seems worth a seri-
ous look.
5 There exists an abundance of neuro-anatomical data
from radiological and lesion studies suggesting that differ-
ent cortical structures participate in (a) the formation and
retention of mental content and (b) its ownership by con-
sciousness. In particular structures in the medial cortex
appear to play a significant role in the production and
storage of content (e.g., Frankland & Bontempi, 2005; Fus-
ter, 1999; Gabrieli, 1998; Nadel, & Moscovitch, 1997;
Nadel & Peterson, 2013; Naya & Suzuki, 2011; Squire,
2004), whereas the frontal and parietal cortices seem more
heavily involved in personal ownership (e.g., Davidson et
al., 2008; Piolino et al., 2007; Tulving & Szpunar, 2012;
Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997; Zahn et al., 2008). Al-
though such data are consistent with the proposed individ-
uation of content and ownership, at this stage they are best
treated as suggestive.
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Philosophical Considerations: Immunity to
Error Through Misidentification
Wittgenstein (1958) famously held that ask-
ing someone with a toothache “are you sure it’s
you who have pains?” (p. 67) is nonsensical.
Although we may improperly identify the target
of a mental state when the target is someone
else (e.g., I hear a voice which I attribute to
John—when, in fact, it was Bob that I heard),
we are immune to such errors of identification
when mental states are ascribed to the self.
Although our interpretation of the content of our
experience may be inaccurate (e.g., the sun trav-
els around the earth; two parallel lines appear to
be converging), we cannot be mistaken about to
whom the experience belongs.
In subsequent work, Shoemaker (1968) de-
veloped Wittgenstein’s observation into the
now well-known proposition that first-person
present-tense statements attributed to oneself
are immune to error through misidentification.
Although several variants of “immunity to error
through misidentification” (IEM) have been
recognized (for discussion see Pryor, 1999), the
take-away message for our purposes is that
IEM, at least in its strong form, is false: Al-
though a person may be unfailingly accurate in
his or her judgment that s/he experienced a
mental state, possessory custody of that state
(e.g., “it is my perception,” “it is my memory,”
“it is my pain”) can be compromised (as the
cases reviewed in “Functional Independence of
Content and Ownership: The Experienced Loss
of Personal Ownership in Cases of Clinical Pa-
thology” and “Functional Independence of Con-
tent and Ownership: The Experienced Loss of
Personal Ownership in Cases of Nonclinical
Pathology” above show). Accordingly, we may
be immune to error in the sense that “I am
experiencing X mental content,” but we cer-
tainly are not immune to error in the sense that
“The mental content I am experiencing belongs
to me.”
A Word of Caution
Let me end with a word of caution. Although
the introspective reports from a variety of
sources converge on the conclusion that content
in consciousness is not automatically given as
“owned,” the ontological status of any hypoth-
esized entity needs to be treated with a consid-
erable degree of conceptual prudence. The
methods that currently dominate psychology do
not (and perhaps cannot; e.g., Gendlin, 1962;
Martin, 2008; Klein, 2012) tap directly into the
heart of our discipline— experiential reality
(e.g., Klein, 2015a). And it is unreasonable to
expect that we can erase our ignorance by rely-
ing on method and theory unsuited to taking
experience in the fullness in which it is given.
Quite possibly, new methods will be needed
(e.g., Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Gendlin, 1962;
Klein, 2012, 2015a; Martin, 2008). If psychol-
ogy is successfully going to fulfill one of its
core missions—to tackle the subjective aspects
of the mind—reliance on objectification and
quantification likely will need to be supple-
mented with methods better-fitted to capturing
the phenomenological richness conferred by ac-
quaintance with our mental states (e.g., Klein,
2015a).
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